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The organization of Organic vegetable supply chains in China  – 
Flexible property rights and different regimes of smallholder inclusion 
 




Abstract: This paper analyses from a property rights perspective to what extent Chinese smallholders are included and 
benefit from converting their land to organic vegetable production supplying chains under two different property rights 
regimes destined for either export or domestic sales. Two case areas were chosen for investigation: 1) the Shanghai 
metropolis where organic vegetable production goes solely for domestic consumption and 2) the rural area around 
Tai’an city in the province of Shandong where the organic vegetable production is destined for export only. In the 
Shanghai metropolis small holders are not included at all in the organic vegetable production due to better off-farm 
employment. Instead the local county has redistributed the land, left idle by the smallholders, and re-lease it out to 
larger organic farm enterprises providing jobs to migrant workers and local women. In the Shandong case village 
cooperatives act as a contractor between an organic processing industry and 1.300smallholders/households belonging to 
17 different villages. The small holders/households are receiving a higher pay than an unskilled labour would get in the 
industry, as well as knowledge transfer on organic production and quality requirements. The two cases illustrate how 
organic farming contributes to a better livelihood for smallholders, farm migrants and women under the present 
politicized capitalism in China. However, the property rights regime, and the outcome of economic organizations found 
in the case studies, could raise serious questions upon the effectiveness and motivations at the farm level to secure a 
high level of quality control  of the organic food products. 
 






In a state socialist redistributive economy, goods and services are allocated through central direction 
by non-market means. By contrast, in a market society, decentralized market exchange serves as the 
main mechanism that allocates goods and services. The Chinese transition economy from state 
socialism to what today can be called ‘politicized capitalism’, has created various forms of 
ownership in the Chinese countryside (Nee, 2005).  
 
                                                 
1 Paul Rye Kledal is a researcher at the Institute of Food & Resource Economics, Copenhagen University and    
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Campbell & Lindberg (1990) shows how a state can shape the economy through the manipulation 
of property rights. The state’s actions create pressure for change that leads actors to look for new 
forms of economic organization. The state also assists, leads, or constrains the process of selecting 
new forms of economic organizations that emerge in response to these pressures, and it may or may 
not ratify these new forms. Likewise they contend that property rights also express and specify 
relationships among people, and therefore also define the institutional basis of power relations in 
the process of production, exchange, and accumulation.  
 
Xiaolin Guo (1999) illustrates how the property relationship between the State, the village 
cooperative and the individual households concerning land rights in China are defined, enforced and 
modified by the township government and village cooperative.  
 
Since property rights are not absolute and can be changed by individual’s actions, the concept of 
property rights is closely related to that of transaction costs (Barzel, 1997). According to Barzel 
transaction costs are the costs associated with the transfer, capture and protection of rights. 
 
During the rural reforms of 1978-1984, collective farming ended in almost all of China, and family 
farms returned as the dominant agricultural form. Each collective divided up the land among its 
individual household members, according to formulas negotiated within the collectives. Previous 
ownership (before the socialist era from 1949) was ignored in favour of formulas based on the 
number of workers and the number of mouths to be feed in a household. By all accounts this 
process went smoothly, and it has been called, with reason, the most egalitarian land reform in 
history (Naughton, 2007). 
 
However, the land system has not changed over to a simple private property system. The land 
tenure system in China is based on land lease contracts, typically for 30 years, owned and controlled 
de facto by a ‘village cooperative’ which extend land lease contracts to individual farm households. 
Households have most of the property rights: they can use, sub-lease and transfer land, but they 
cannot sell it.  
 
The village cooperatives usually comprise between 300-500 households and each household 
typically consists of several tiny and separated plots. More than 80 per cent of all farm households  
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operates less than 0.6 ha and confirms the dominance of small scale farming in China (OECD, 
2005). Village cooperatives are again organized in ‘townships’, which normally comprise between 
10-20 villages. In some areas townships may influence village land policies, including village-wide 
land re-allocations. Township districts themselves are under the jurisdiction of counties which are 
responsible for the overall planning of land utilisation. Their duties also include issuing land 
contract certificates to farmers. Counties belong again to the provinces. 
 
The politicized capitalism practised under present day transition economy in China has created a 
variety of different property regimes, some of hybrid nature. According to Sanders (2006) four 
major types coexist in various parts of rural China: State ownership, partially-privatised common 
ownership, fully-fledged common ownership and open access. 
 
However, the complexity, and in some cases lack of secure land tenure within the Chinese property 
rights regimes, combined with the fast development of the Chinese economy creating better off-
farm employment opportunities, affects farmer incentives on longer term investments (OECD, 
2005). Likewise the dominance of small scale farming combined “fuzzy” property rights would 
mean larger coordination and uncertainty cost downstream when demand from modern supply 
chains increases. 
 
Organic market growth and demand 
Demand for Chinese organic products has grown rapidly since the first organic tea was certified in 
1990. In terms of number of farm enterprises, arable land and export value the certified organic area 
in 2005 were estimated to be approximately 4.4 Mio. Ha. However, 2.1 ha are certified for wild 
collection, 630.000 ha are under conversion and 998.000 ha are used for crop acreage (Kledal et al, 
2007). China’s organic farmland of 2.3 million ha would therefore represent approximately 2 pct. of 
the country’s 130 million ha of cultivated land, and the organic export value of 350 Mio. USD 
would amount to 1.5 pct. of Chinas total agricultural export of 23 Billion USD in 2004.  
 
As illustrated in table A (Appendix) the major organic production is concentrated in 10 Eastern 
provinces out of Chinas 31 provinces. In the North East provinces production is dominated by 
various beans, cereals and oilseeds, whereas in the southern provinces production is mainly teas, 
fruits for juice, rice, ginger and vegetables. Approximately 1/3 of the organic arable land are in the  
  4
southern provinces, but characterized by more intensive crop production in terms of labour use. The 
vegetable production itself is concentrated in the two south east provinces of Jiangsu and Shandong 
as well as around the city of Shanghai. The Shandong province is the largest organic vegetable 
producer concentrated around Tai’an city with its 11.227 ha certified organic (www.cqagri.gov.cn, 
2001 July 30
th) & (www.cctv7.com.cn , 2007 January 26
th). 
 
The number of enterprises involved in organic primary production and processing are 
approximately 1.600, but the number of individual households growing organic is significant higher 
although the amount unknown (Kledal et al, 2007). One of the main reasons for this is due to the 
way land rights have been distributed historically in China.  
 
However, studies reveal great flexibility on land allocation among counties, townships and villages 
making larger scale contract farming feasible for private foreign companies (OECD, 2005) as well 
as processing industries within organic production (Sanders, 2006). In this paper we have analysed 
to what extent Chinese smallholders are included and benefit from converting their land to organic 
vegetable production supplying chains under two different property rights regimes destined for 
either export or domestic sales.  
 
 
2.  Methodology and data collection 
To carry out studies of the organisation, economic as well as physical commodity flow of the 
organic vegetable chain in China, two case areas were chosen. The first was the metropolis of 
Shanghai, and the second the city of Tai’an in the province of Shandong. Shanghai was chosen 
because the domestic consumption of organic vegetables is most developed around Shanghai, 
whereas around the city of Tai’an the organic vegetable chain is the most important concerning 
export only. 
 
Methodological approach applied has been a combination of qualitative interviews supported by 
quantitative data when ever possible to be obtained. The period of information and data collection 
was from January to May 2007. 
 
The domestic consumer driven vegetable chain (Shanghai).  
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In our preliminary studies the most valuable data found on organic vegetable production in 
Shanghai was the newsletter “Organic Trends - Newsletter for Organic Farming and food 
development in China, Jan/Feb 2006” www.chinaeol.net/cesdrrc. The newsletter was specifically 
describing where to buy organic food products with names and addresses of farms, restaurants and 
shop outlets in Shanghai. In table 1, the number of enterprises listed in the newsletter is illustrated. 
In the newsletter four farms were listed, but one of them produced only strawberries. The other 
three were purely vegetable producers. Two restaurants were selling organic meals, and 30 different 
consumer outlets like supermarkets, health shops etc. were selling organic food products 
 
Table 1: Number of organic enterprises in Shanghai  
Type of node  Number of enterprises 
Consumer outlets  30 
Restaurants    2 
Farms    3 
Source: www.china.net/cesdrrc (Jan/Feb. 2006) 
 
With this information qualitative interviews were made starting up with visits to the various 
consumer outlets, restaurants and farms interviewing key persons in the various nodes of the chain. 
In this way the organic vegetable supply network was drawn up, discovering that Shanghai had 
seven organic vegetable enterprises and one under conversion. This amount was later confirmed by 
the “Shanghai Agricultural Technology Development and Service Center” (www.agri.sh.cn), where 
Yu Fanming, employed at the department of vegetables, had written respectively a book and an 
article on organic vegetable production [in Chinese] (Yu, 2001 & 2004/ Feb). Also the certification 
bureau OFDC (Organic Food Development Center) confirmed the number of organic vegetable 
farm enterprises in Shanghai since they were all certified there. 
 
One may argue that information on the amount and type of organic farms existing around Shanghai 
could have been collected from the certification bureaus, but there are now 26 of them in China and 
their importance differs from each province and product. Since most of them are all private they are 
also reluctant to give valuable information unless good contacts and trust building are pre-
established. There is no central office in China that gathers data on organic farms and production 
from province level and down. 
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After drawing up the chain in Shanghai a second round of more in-depth interviews was made with 
key persons in the various nodes of the chain. Information was collected on the type of vegetables 
produced; the amount harvested and sold; modes of contracting and payments for input factors 
(land, labour) as well as contracting for supplies downstream to various consumer markets.  
 
The export driven chain (Tai’an – Shandong) 
Through earlier cooperation with Doctor Xi Yunguan from OFDC in Nanjing valuable insight was 
given by him to aim our focus at the Shandong province, and the rural area around the Tai’an city 
concerning organic vegetable production destined for export only. According to Doctor Xi Yunguan 
the organic vegetable production chain arund Tai’an is the most developed and largest in China.  
The organic vegetable area around Tai’an covers 800 ha, and the export value amounts to 30 
million USD, which covers 50 per cent of Tai’ans total vegetable export (www.sdny.gov.cn, 2007 
March 14
th [in Chinese]).  
 
Dr. Xi Yunguan also recommended establishing contact with the “Tai’an Taishan Asia Food 
Company (TTAFC)”. It is the most important organic exporting company in Tai’an, contracting 534 
ha and thereby covering 2/3 of all organic land around Tai’an. TTAFC is a food processing 
company exporting frozen organic vegetables mainly to Japan, USA and Europe. Ninety per cent of 
the export goes to Japan and USA with approximately forty five to each, and the last ten per cent 
goes to Europe.  
 
Contacts was made with TTAFC and interviews as well as visits were made to the 17 villages 
which TTAFC contracts with concerning supply of organic vegetables. A similar set of data 
collection through the questionnaire was as in the domestic driven chain in Shanghai. 
 
3. Results 
The domestic consumer driven vegetable chain (Shanghai): 
The general attempt in China to stimulate household-based larger scale farming (dahu) was on the 
organic vegetable production in Shanghai found to follow the form called fanzudaibao. It is a 
property rights form developed mostly in the coastal area where a village, township or a county 
rents land from farmers in a unified area, then invests in various types of facilities like roads, water 
supply or greenhouses, and later rents the land out to an external investor. It will be the form  
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classified by Sanders (2006) as partially privatised common ownership. The reason for this 
predominant property rights form in the coastal area was explained by the managers interviewed at 
the organic farm enterprises to be caused by the fast growing off-farm employment opportunities in 
this part of China. In several cases the farmland had been idle or underutilized for some years 
before converting to organic due to a combination of farmers having better off-farm employment, 
and in the same time not being able to make a more efficient allocation or land transfer. 
 
However, the county districts of Shanghai mentioned in table 2 have been a major actor behind 
reallocations of underutilized household properties. Instead of just renting out the land to the 
farmers, who all have the property rights, the counties renegotiated and renewed the contracts with 
the farmers, so the farmers are now indirectly renting out the land use right to organic farm 
enterprises on contracts valid between 15-30 years. In Shanghai all organic vegetable production 
was based on such a property rights regime. 
 
In table 2 the seven organic vegetable farm enterprises found are listed with the year of starting 
organic sales, their farm size, field workers employed and daily output. Output is approximately 
112 kg/day/ha leaving total organic vegetable production from Shanghai to be 3175 tonnes/year. 
 
Table 2: Organic vegetable enterprises in Shanghai 2007 






Songjiang Shanghai  Organic 
Agriculture Co. Ltd 
1999 12  40  1400 
Songjiang Shanghai  Green 
Total Horticulture 
Co. Ltd 
2005 11  53  1100 
Fengxian Shanghai  Fengpu 
Organic Agriculture 
Co. Ltd 
1999 12  46  1300 
Fengxian Shanghai  Xinghui 
Vegetable Co. Ltd 
2001 9    1000 
Jiading Shanghai  Xiaxiyang 
Organic Agriculture 
Co. Ltd 
2001 10    1200 
Minhang Shanghai  Chengshi 
Vegetable 
Horticulture Co. Ltd 





2004 18  72  2000 
Total  7    78    8700 
Source: own table based on interviews  
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The organic farm enterprises produce around sixty different vegetables during the year consisting of 
two seasons. Some of the vegetables are produced all year around whereas others are bound to the 
season and its climate conditions. 
In table 3 the ten most produced and sold organic vegetables are listed. They are also the products 
being produced all year round. 
 






Green pepper  
Cucumber  





          Source: Own table based on interviews 
 
In the Shanghai property rights model smallholders are not included at all. They have indirectly 
abandoned farming for better paid urban jobs. The labour used at the new organic farm enterprises 
consists mainly of local women and elderly men migrating from other provinces. Asking the farm 
managers which provinces they came from they answered they did not know. 
In relation to previous studies showing a rapid proportion of young people in Chinese migration 
specializing in off-farm employment to urban areas (de Brauw et al, 2002), our studies seems to 
indicate that men from thirty years of age and above, having low education and no real off-farm 
labour opportunities, make up the migrant force within Chinese agriculture. 
 
In table 3 the labour input from one farm enterprise has been classified in terms of modes of 
organisation, male or female, local or migrated. The sex of the labour on the farm enterprises was 
generally fifty-fifty between male and female, but is made up by predominant local women and 
predominant migrant men. The migrant labour lives in dormitories for free and their wage of 700-
800 RMB is supplied by 1 or 2 meals per day, often the organic vegetables discarded for not living 
up to the quality requirements demanded by the consumer outlets. Thirty to forty per cent of the  
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organic vegetables were on average discarded at the Shanghai Organic Agriculture Company, 
which is a dominant company brand among supermarkets in Shanghai. Cost of living in Shanghai 
was told to be around minimum 2.000 RMB/month.  The 800 RMB/month is typically 200 RMB 
more per month than what an unskilled labour can earn in a factory in provinces outside Shanghai – 
this type of off-farm work is available.  
 
 Table 3: Labour input classification on organic farm enterprise in Shanghai metropolis 2007 
Sex (%)  Sex (%)  Modes of payment 
Migrant  Local 
Modes of Labour 
organization   
M 
 




2 work shifts (morning 
+ evening) 
 

























Consisting of discarded 
vegetables not living up 
to the quality 
requirements of the 
consumer outlets  
Source: own table based on interviews 
 
The local women were attracted by the work because it made it possible for them to earn an income, 
and in the same time sustain traditional housewife obligations close to home such as taking care of 
children and preparing food. 
 
When contracting with various consumer outlets in Shanghai the contracts are negotiated for a 
whole year and prices are fixed. Typically the period of credit before consumer outlets pay back for 
the vegetables purchased is between 30-60 days. The Chinese organic farm enterprises therefore 
seem to follow a similar pattern found among the organic vegetable producers in Denmark during 
their introduction phase between 1981to 2000 concerning fixed prices during a production season. 
However, today sales and prices in the Danish organic vegetable sector are decided weekly based 
on market demand and supply (Kledal, 2006). 
 
The type of consumer outlets where the organic enterprises sell their products is listed in table 6. 
Like countries in the North supermarkets are the main driver of organic sales in Shanghai covering 
2/3 of the consumption whereas restaurants, specialty shops and direct sales covers the last 1/3.  
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Table 6: Type of consumer outlets selling organic products and their market share 
Type of outlet  Market share (%) 
Supermarkets 60-70 
Restaurants/Hotels 8-12 
Specialty shops  5-10 
Direct sales  2-5 
Tourist resorts  1-3 
Source: Own table based on interview 
 
Among the supermarkets buying organic foreign companies like Wall Mart, Carrefour, Parkson are 
found in the market together with Chinese supermarkets like Hualian Shiji and Nong Gong Shang. 
The supermarkets selling organic products are all placed in residential areas of high income, or 
close to Universities, and the majority of consumers are foreigners from the North (USA, EU and 
Japan), Hong Kong and Taiwan. Chinese consumers buying organic are among the higher middle 
class. In (Fang, 2002 [in Chinese]) the proportion of organic consumers among foreigners and high 
middle class ethnic Chinese was found to be 8:2. That means for every eight foreigners buying 
organic there would be two high income earning Chinese consumers. 
 
The export driven vegetable chain (Tai’an – Shandong):  
In rural areas property rights have remained complex and locally negotiated. There is no national 
land registry where property rights are inscribed. Instead, each individual village cooperative holds 
records of the land-use rights that have been distributed by village action. The form of property 
rights hold by the village cooperatives would be classified by Sanders (2006) as fully fledged 
common ownership. 
 
To secure a critical mass of supply to a vegetable processing company like TTAFC they would have 
to follow a different path in organizing the organic vegetable supply chain. With the dominant 
smallholder farming in China the organization of the supply chain would involve large coordination 




As illustrated in table 7 the number of villages involved in contract farming with TTAFC is 
seventeen. The seventeen villages comprise altogether 1.300 households that have converted to 
organic vegetable production. Not all households in the villages have converted. 
The contracting area amounts to 534 ha leaving each household with 0.4 ha on average. Eighteen 
different vegetables are produced during three harvest times producing 9.133 tonnes of vegetables
2. 
The villages were altogether paid (in 2006) approximately 13 million RMB leaving each household 
with 10.000 RMB. 
 


















TTAFC 17  1.300  534  18/  9.133  13.000  10 
Source: TTAFC and interviews with smallholder farmers at the villages  
 
In the Shandong province off-farm employment opportunities are few, and wages as an unskilled 
labour in a factory amounts to approximately 600 RMB/month or around 7-8.000 RMB/year. The 
land as an asset for household food supply as well as a home is therefore relatively higher for 
smallholders in Shandong than in Shanghai. The trade off for the smallholders in the villages to take 
on the transaction costs of organizing and transfer land from mostly self-sufficiency to an ‘organic 
pool’ for vegetable production sold at a market, are therefore relatively high.  
 
Since rural population has to pay for school and medical care, contrary to urban people, the income 
from producing organic vegetables for a market is also welcomed. 
 
The contracting itself is taking place between the village and the company. The village cooperative 
arranges with its households to convert organic vegetable production supplying TTAFC. In the 
same contract TTAFC agrees with the village to buy the organic production specified in terms of 
hectare used, expected output etc. The village cooperative is the main node where control and 
production responsibility takes place. The company itself has a staff of 7 personal driving out 
everyday to the various villages consulting and making an overall control. Equally TTAFC has 1 or 
2 technical staff stationed in each village to consult and control the production management.  
                                                 
2 In appendix in table B the 18 vegetables are specified in terms of production and economic value.  
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In table 8 the specific contract requirements between village collective and TTAFC is illustrated. 
 
Table 8: Contract requirements between village collective and TTAFC (2006) 
General agreement  Village responsibilities  Company responsibilities  Sanctions 
Type of product produced 
 
Amount of ha utilized 
 




Payments two time per 
year: 
August & January 
 
If company cannot pay in 
time company pays amount 
+ interest rate 
Follow the organic rule 
 
Fulfil quality requirements 
specified 
 
Control ha corresponds 
with contract 
 
Secure time of 
planting/sowing 
 
 Secure time of harvest 
 
Village cannot sell to other 
companies 
Buy what is specified in 
production contract 
(amount & quality) 
 
If yields +/- 5 % companies 




If pesticide residues found 
x vegetable company 
refuses to pay for x 
production 
 
If conventional products 
found company refuses to 
buy x vegetable and pay for 
already bought x vegetable 
Source: Contract between TTAFC and villages 2006 
 
An indirect company control on village responsibilities, revealed through the interviews of TTAFC, 
was the one the company holds through its time of payments to the village cooperatives/farmers. 
Payments were deliberately made in August and January. In august school starts and the rural 
population with children has to pay a school fee. The households therefore need a larger sum of 
money at this time. In January Chinese New Year festival starts, and the households will require 




The cases examined on the organization of the organic vegetable chain show a very close link to the 
way land-use rights in rural and peri-urban areas are administrated in China’s present transition 
economy of politicized capitalism. In both cases the local political administration has been the main 
actor on land transfer to obtain larger scale farming and economies of scale. In the Shanghai 
metropolis the county level was behind a re-allocation and land transfer, and they were the node of 
contracting between farm enterprises and farmers.   
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In the Shandong province the village cooperative was the node of contracting between farmers and 
processing company. 
 
In the Shanghai metropolis smallholder farmers are not included at all in the organic vegetable 
chain, but their property right to the land entitles them to be included in a political process of 
negotiating a better re-allocation of their land use right. A re-allocation of their land together with 
their off-farm employment possibilities in Shanghai metropolis formalizes an already established 
migration from rural to urban. The re-allocation secures better economies of scale and introduces 
modern organic industrial farm production creating new jobs and income possibilities. In the 
Shanghai case these jobs were partly given to local women and elderly men migrating from other 
provinces. 
 
In the Shandong province around the Tai’an city off-farm employment is poor leaving small holder 
farmers with no alternative than to stay in the village. The problem of high coordination and control 
costs for companies seeking larger scale farming in vegetable production is solved by the village 
cooperative. They organize the many small holders to join ‘a pool’ of organic land and thereby 
make it feasible for an organic processing industry to secure supplies and economies of scale. The 
small holder farmers have in this way connected themselves to an organic world market achieving 
greater knowledge on quality requirements, but also receiving an income higher than an unskilled 
factory job would give them. However, off-farm job opportunities are not an option. 
 
Both examples illustrate the flexibility within the Chinese politicised transition economy to 
overcome the constraints of the present day Chinese farm structure, and how different 
administrative levels have taken advantage of the growing demand for organic products 
domestically as well as for export.  
 
However, the property rights regime, and the outcome of economic organizations found in the case 
studies, could raise serious questions upon the effectiveness and motivations at the farm level to 
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Table A: Chinese provinces concentrated with certified organic production, major produce, arable land and value (US 
$) derived from domestic as well as export sales (2005) 
  Province  Major crop produced  Certified organic  
area (1.000 ha) 
Domestic sales 
(Mio. US $) 
Export sales 
(Mio. US $) 


















404 29,9  4 






68 66,5  39 
North East 









Wild c. canthus 
Wild rose 
9 62,6  19 
Jiangxi Green  tea 









9 5,5  9,5 





7,4 48  21,6 
Provinces in table  10    1.481  298,8  128 
Total China  31    4.400    350 
% of total China      33    37 
Source: Kledal et al (2007). The data are from the 10 provinces are based on information from  COFCC and ECOCERT covering 33 pct. of all 
certified area in China and 37 pct. of the total organic export value. Thus there will be some bias in terms of the organic area in each province as well 


















In table B the 18 organic different types of vegetables that TTAFC processes, produced at 534 ha 
are illustrated as well as the farm gate cost for TTAFC. In 2006 TTAFC bought organic vegetables 
for13 million RMB. 
 











1 Green  Asparagus  69.3  7.26  1163  8444 
2  Broccoli 130 1.66  2439 4048 
3 Green  Beans  99  2.26  1535 3470 
4 Edamame  94.1  1.66 726  1205 
5 Green  Vegetable  69.4  0.56  2031  1138 
6  Taro 20.1  1.26 761  959 
7 Cauliflower  19 1.26  644 811 
8 Green  Pepper  2  4.83  101  489 
9 Carrot  17.8  0.56  410  229 
10 Sugar  snap  Pea  4.3  2.26  79  178 
11 Burdok  2.8  1.66 105  174 
12 Cucumber  2.5 0.9  172 155 
13 Radish  2.5  0.56  106  59 
14  小松菜
3  0.5 0.56  12  7 
15 Peanut  0.7  3  2  6 
16  Green Petiole Cabbage  0.4  0.56  8  4 
17  紫苏
4  0.1 12  0.3  4 
18 Potato  0.1 1.22  2  2 
Total  18  534.6    9133.3  12.938 






                                                 
3 In Chinese: “Xiaosongcai”, but the English translation has not been able to be found 
4 In Chinese: “Zisu”, but the English translation has not been able to be found 